How the war in Bosnia started and the genocide of Bosniak muslims
Post-Yugoslav Bosnia
Yugoslavia’s unraveling was hastened by the rise of ethnic nationalism, as Bosnian Muslims looked to Alija Izetbegović, Serbs to Slobodan Milošević and Croats to Franjo Tuđman.
Bosnia and Herzegovina was the only Yugoslav Republic where there was no majority of a single ethnicity, and its capital Sarajevo was also mixed. While the ethnic communities in Sarajevo tolerated each other and mixed in day-to-day life, they frequently married within their own groups and so the ethnic communities remained to some extent separate. By the early 1990s Bosnia therefore became a particularly problematic area.
The problem was sparked when the first separate elections in the Yugoslav Republics were held: in Bosnia, this resulted in an assembly dominated by three ethnically-based parties, which had formed a loose coalition to oust the Yugoslav Communist Party. As leader of the largest party, Alija Izetbegović became President. Izetbegović had been jailed in 1983 for publishing the “Islamic Declaration” which implied Bosnia as an Islamic state, and released in 1990 when he formed a nationalist centre-right party called the ‘Party of Democratic Action’ (SDA) which pledged to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina as a multiethnic state. He more or less abandoned his youth ideology of an Islamic State. His banned manifesto was reprinted in 1990 in Belgrade and was used by Serbian nationalists as a tool to implicate him for nationalistic activity. Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, each with a following among the Bosnians of their respective nationalities, met on March 25, 1991 in Karađorđevo and reportedly discussed and agreed upon a division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between their two states. The connection of Bosnian Croats with the Croats in Croatia was particularly obvious given that Tuđman’s political party was the sister party of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ).
In 1991, Slovenia declared independence which caused a short conflict with the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) which tried to prevent secession. When, later that year, Croatia followed, the JNA intervened in support of the Serb majority in the Krajina which hoped at the least to separate from Croatia. While the proportion of ethnicities in different areas varied, Bosnia was quite ethnically heterogenous and it was difficult if not impossible to suggest any way of partitioning the state in order to create three separate states. The Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina provided for three constitutional nations: Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks, so no major constitutional changes were to be granted short of a unanimous agreement from all three sides.
On February 29 and March 1 1992, the Bosnian government held a referendum on independence. The Bosnian Croats and Bosniaks mostly voted in favour. The Bosnian Serbs, largely against independence, boycotted the referendum claiming that it was unconstitutional: the Serb delegates in parliament had not approved it. With a 99% vote for independence on a turnout of 66% of eligible voters, the Bosniak and Croat representatives in Bosnia’s parliament declared the republic’s independence on April 5, 1992. The Serb delegates, having previously seceded over the violation of the Constitution, declared their own state Republika Srpska at midnight on April 7.
Under pressure from Germany, the European Union countries recognized the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina by April 7, as did the United States, and the country was admitted to the United Nations on May 22.
War in Bosnia
See main article: Bosnian War
Bosnia after the war
Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton AgreementThe Dayton Agreement divides Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly equally between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republika Srpska, based mostly on their wartime borders with few negotiatied modifications. The line that delineates the enitities is known as the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL).
The third incarnation of the war in the former Yugoslavia prompted the UN to establish the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The Hague on May 25, 1993, which started work in 1996. The warring parties committed war crimes, committed ethnic cleansing, formed internment camps often compared to concentration camps.
In 1995–1996, a NATO-led international peacekeeping force (IFOR) of aprox 54,000 troops from 32 countries served in Bosnia to implement and monitor the military aspects of the agreement. The country was divided into three sectors, with the north east controlled by US lead forces, the north west by British forces, and the south (including Sarajevo, Mostar and Gorazde) French lead.
IFOR was succeeded by a smaller, NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) whose mission was to deter renewed hostilities. SFOR’s duties were in turn taken over by an even smaller, EU-led EUFOR at the end of 2004.
The United Nations‘ International Police Task Force in Bosnia was replaced at the end of 2002 by the European Union Police Mission, the first such police training and monitoring taskforce from the European Union.
Feelings among Bosnia’s three nations regarding their roles in the war are based mostly on two issues; whether the war was initiated by Serbian aggression, and whether Croat and Serbdom was or would have been infringed upon in an independent Bosnian state. Bosniaks overwhelmingly feel the war was a clear case of Serbian aggression and that the new Bosnian state was and would have been peacefully multi-ethnic. The vast majority of Serbs on the other hand believe that there was no aggression on their part, but rather a needed effort to protect Serbdom and the presence of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina which would have been infringed upon in a Bosnian state. Bosnian Croats mostly find themselves between these two views, believing that the war was a case of Serbian aggression but that Croatian culture and presence in the Bosnian state was and/or would have been infringed upon.
It has been argued that, throughout the conflict, the international community (especially the United Nations) has made fatal errors in evaluating the situation. This is a point of contention — opinions range from those that say they should have intervened earlier and stopped the bloodshed, to those who question whether they should have intervened at all. The Secretary-General of the UN accepted that his organisation’s policy in Bosnia, in particular its policy of neutrality throughout the conflict, was entirely wrong and misguided.[1]
The western media’s reporting of the conflict pursued the doctrine of ‘moral equivalence’, portraying all warring sides as bad as each other. It is technically true that war crimes were committed by all sides during the conflict. However, much as it would be absurd to say that all sides were therefore equally tainted in World War II, neither were they in this war.
A very large number of casualties arose from the concentration camps held mainly by the Serbs (some by the Croats in Herzegovina), which sometimes encompassed whole cities. Here, forms of torture had been implemented by the Serb nationalists “Chetniks” that were used on the mostly Muslim population of Bosnia (This has been documented even in WWII, where atrocities have been committed against a number non-Serbs by the members of the parts of Serbian Royal Guerrila. Also, over half a million Serbs were killed in the concentration camps held by the Croat Independent State of Croatia, from 1941 through 1945). Individuals that survived these atrocities are constantly appearing in media with stories of physical, sexual and psychological torture resembling those of the Holocaust. Bosniak-dominated central government, on the other side, allowed Mujaheddin (holy warriors) to carry on fightings against Serbs and Croats in the Zenica Canton area (and wider) during which many atrocities against the Serbs and Croats were committed. Furthermore, Bosniaks held prisoners in concentration camps such as Celebici. The ethinic cleansing resulted in most of the areas being “cleared” off the non-dominating group, with the notable exception of Tuzla, in the Bosniak part, where many Serbs and Croats remained. Vast areas of predominantly Serb Bosanska Krajina area have seen the loss of Serbian population, as well as some areas of central Bosnia. In the Repulika Srpska contiguous Croat and Bosniak areas have been ethnically cleansed. Sarajevo, the capital, still has the single-digit percentages of the pre-war Serb and Croat populations, while Mostar and Zenica have been almost completely ethnically cleansed of Serbs. The majority Bosniaks and Croats fled most of Banja Luka, the administrative center of the Republika Srpska.
Since the end of the war, Bosnia has been a major source and destination country in the trafficking of women, women forced into prostitution and sexual slavery [2] [3].
In a major sign of change and reconciliation, on 18 July 2005 Bosnia’s politicians made the decision to unify their armed forces, merging the Serb, Croat and Bosniak armies into a single multi-ethnic State Army [4].
Bosnian Genocide
This article is about genocide that took place during the Bosnian War from 1992–1995. Other cases of genocide in the same region during World War II are covered in other articles.
The Bosnian Genocide or Bosnia Genocide was killing of Bosnians, predominantly male Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 by the army and police forces organized by Republika Srpska.
The Bosnian Genocide is a term used by some academic and human rights institutions when referring to the case of genocide that took place in Srebrenica which has been proven at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) through the court case entitled Prosecutor vs Krstić (see Srebrenica Massacre). Thus far the Srebrenica massacre has been the only case which the UN Hague tribunal has officially defined as genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The presentation of evidence implicating the killing of at least 8,000 persons, predominantly Bosniaks has been made. Bosnian-Herzegovina Commission for Missing Persons claims that the number of killings is much greater than has been currently represented at the tribunal.
Recent developments
There are several genocide trials and indictments relating to the Bosnian War currently at the ICTY including Milosevic trial and Karadžić and Mladić indictments for genocide. Above genocide indictments also include incidents where a significant number of Bosnian Croats may have also been killed, particularly in Bosanska Krajina territories which were under control of Army of Republika Srpska. Statistics may change as these and other cases (such as the Siege of Sarajevo) develop.
US resolution 199
On June 27 2005, the United States House of Representatives passed a resolution (H. Res. 199 sponsored by Congressman Christopher Smith and Congressman Benjamin Cardin) commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Srebrenica genocide. The resolution was passed with overwhelming majority of 370 – YES votes, 1 – NO vote, and 62 – ABSENT .
The resolution is a bipartisan measure commemorating July 11, 1995-2005, the tenth anniversary of the Srebrenica massacre in which almost 8,000 men and boys were meticulously and methodically separated from their daughters, mothers, sisters and wives and then killed by Serb forces, buried in mass graves and then re-interred in secondary graves to cover up the crimes. Srebrenica fell to invading Serb forces on July 11, 1995 which at the time had been declared a UN “safe area” under the protection of the international community. The Srebrenica massacre was the worst genocidal atrocity in Europe since World War II.
The resolution states that “the policies of aggression and ethnic cleansing1|2 as implemented by Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 and 1995 with the direct support of Serbian regime of Slobodan Milošević and its followers ultimately led to the displacement of more than 2,000,000 people, an estimated 200,000 killed, tens of thousands raped or otherwise tortured and abused, and the innocent civilians of Sarajevo and other urban centers repeatedly subjected to shelling and sniper attacks; meet the terms defining the crime of genocide in Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, created in Paris on December 9, 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951.”
Background
On May 12, 1992, at a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Radovan Karadžić announced the six “strategic objectives” of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina:
- Establish state borders separating the Serbian people from the other two ethnic communities.
- Establish a corridor in the Drina river valley, that is, eliminate the Drina as a border separating Serbian states.
- Divide the city of Sarajevo into Serbian and Bosniak parts and establish effective state authorities in both parts.
- Ensure access to the sea for Republika Srpska.
In particular regard to the “strategic objective” #1, general Ratko Mladić (who was later indicted for genocide) told the Assembly that it would not be possible to separate Serbs from non-Serbs and have the non-Serbs simply leave the territory. He warned that attempting this process would amount to genocide. [1]. Karadžić was also quite explicit about this, saying that Serbs cannot live with other nations. They must have their own separate existence. To many this prior awareness of the consequences and the ultimate results of the objective make the crimes committed as premeditated genocide. Others say that General Mladic was actually warning the politicians not to attempt this action.
Statements
Statement by Radovan Karadžić, co-founder of Republika Srpska and its first president, alluded to the origins of this ideology on March 4, 1992 to the Bosnian Parliament:
…”the road to which you want to take Bosnia and Herzegovina is the same highway of hell which Slovenia and Croatia took. Don’t think you won’t take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and the Muslims into annihilation… Muslims can’t defend themselves if there is war here”…Statements by Jovan Rašković, founder of the Serbian Democratic Party of Croatia:
“I feel responsible because I made the preparations for this war, even if not the military preparations. If I hadn’t created this emotional strain in the Serbian people, nothing would have happened.”My party and I lit the fuse of Serbian nationalism not only in Croatia but everywhere else in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It’s impossible to imagine an SDP (Serbian Democratic Party) in Bosnia-Herzegovina or a Mr. Karadzic in power without our influence.”We have driven this people and we have given it an identity. I have repeated again and again to this people that it comes from heaven, not earth.”Statements by Biljana Plavšić. Biljana Plavšić, the highest-ranking Serbian politician from the former Yugoslavia who pleaded guilty to a single charge of crimes against humanity and expressed “full remorse” in exchange for prosecutors dropping seven other war crimes charges, including two counts of genocide.
Plavšić’s statement, read in her native Serbian, repeated her admission of guilt. It said she had refused to believe stories of atrocities against Bosniaks and Croatians and accepted without question the claims that Serbs were fighting for survival.
“I have now … accepted that many thousands of innocent people were the victims of organized, systematic efforts from the territory claimed by Serbs…The knowledge that I’m responsible for such human suffering and for soiling the character of my people will always be with me.” she said.In an interview she gave in March 2005 to the Banja Luka Alternative Television, however, she admitted to have lied because she couldn’t prove her innocence, as she was unable to find witnesses who would testify on her behalf. [2]
Denial, revisionism and scepticism
Many Serb groups espouse denial of the genocide, claiming that the intentional mass murder of nearly 8,000 Bosniaks in case of Srebrenica massacre is grossly exaggerated and that Republika Srpska government had no extermination policy. Some others, who don’t deny mass killings by the Republika Srpska have engaged in pointing out “immoral equivalencies” (e.g. the killings and the ethnic cleansing of Serbs in Croatia) and/or justifications for the executions (e.g. retaliation or punishment for sabotage, terrorism, or subversion).
Manipulation of the number of victims has also become and effective tool to cloud issues surrounding Bosnian genocide particulary since there are vast discrepencies in original and more recent estimates on how many victims there were and which ethnic group suffered most casulties. (see Bosnian War).